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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
IT IS TIME FOR SOMETHING NEW: A
21 ST CENTURY JOINT-EMPLOYER
DOCTRINE FOR 21 ST CENTURY
FRANCHISING
STEVEN A. CARVELL* AND DAVID SHERWYN**
The United States is competing in a 21st century global economy, and
this leads to 21st century employment relations issues. Unfortunately,
the government, courts, and administrative agencies are trying to solve
these 21st century global problems with agency theory, joint-employer
doctrine, single entity doctrine, and apparent authority, 20th, 19th,
18th ... century legal doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
The joint-employer doctrine is perhaps the hottest issue in labor and
employment law for 2015 and the foreseeable future. In the September
2015 Browning-Ferris ("BFr') decision,1 the National Labor Relations
Board (the "NLRB" or the "Board"), the administrative agency that
enforces the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA" or the "Act"),
issued what is expected to be the first of two decisions, expanding the joint-
employer doctrine. In the BFI decision, the so-called putative employer
(e.g., the lessor of employees or a franchisor) is now considered the
employer of individuals who had in the past been considered employees of
the supplier employer. Like in Browning-Ferris, a number of McDonald's
employees and the Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") are
arguing that the world's largest franchisor is the joint employer of all its
franchisees' employees.2 At first blush, one might believe that this is
another esoteric labor and employment law issue that only lawyers and
scholars care about. However, depending on how the Board and courts rule
on this issue, the joint-employer doctrine could fundamentally change
business in the United States by destroying the franchise model.
The purpose of this Article is to fully explore the joint-employer doctrine
in the franchise industry. It provides a quick overview of the history and
breadth of the franchise industry. Included in this Section is an analysis of
1. See generally Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015).
2. See NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints Against
McDonald's Franchisees and their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint
Employers, NLRB (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-
story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-issues-consolidated-complaints-against.
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why employers/people become franchisors and franchisees. Section II
analyses the joint-employer doctrine with regard to franchisees and
franchisors. This section not only explores the current state of the law, but
it also discusses the arguments presented by the Board, the EEOC, and
other employee advocates to expand the doctrine. Section III discusses the
latest administrative decision on the joint-employer doctrine. Section IV
notes that expanding the joint-employer doctrine will be counterproductive
to employees unless all, or at least substantially all, franchisees' employees
are joint employees of their franchisors. Section V explains that, because
there is now too much focus on legal concerns, our country is ignoring the
realities of the modem workplace and the realities of the modem consumer
and that governmental entities should look for a "third way" to protect
employees while also protecting the franchise model.
I. FRANCHISING HISTORY AND STRUCTURE
At its most basic level, franchising is a business model where the
brands/franchisors contract with franchisees to own/operate outlets of the
franchisors' business. The franchisees own the business, generally use
their own capital to build/build out/lease the property, employ the
employees, are liable for any employment or tort lawsuits, and keep all the
profits. The franchisors, among other things, charge the franchisee an
initial franchise fee and take a royalty fee through a percentage of the gross
revenue from on-going operations. In addition, the franchisor charges the
franchisee additional fees for marketing and advertising. The sum of these
fees can be substantial, often exceeding ten percent of total revenue.
3
In exchange, franchisors provide their franchisees with a business model,
brand recognition, education for the franchisees on how to operate their
businesses, and other services. Most importantly, franchisors provide the
franchisees with a brand that holds the promise of creating value through
brand loyalty, brand awareness, perceived quality/consistency, and brand
image.4 In a world where everything, such as restaurants; clothes; and
athletes, are considered "brands," the value of a brand's equity cannot be
underestimated. The model works for both sides of the contract because
franchisees get a turn-key business with support while franchisors get to
expand relatively quickly without absorbing substantial financial risk and
while tapping into their own scarce capital resources. This does not mean,
however, that there is no risk involved. With each additional new
3. See Stephen Rushmore, Jr. & Erin S. Bagley, 2014 United States Hotel Franchise
Fee Guide, HVS GLOBAL HOSPITALITY SERVICES 2, 9-11 (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.hvs.com/Jump/Article/Download.aspx?id=7097.
4. See generally D.A. Aaker, Measuring Brand Equity Across Products and
Markets, 38 CAL. MGMT. REV. 102 (1996).
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franchisee, the franchisor risks its brand equity. Will the franchisees fail to
live up to brand standards? If they fail to comply with brand standards,
will the consistency and quality that drives the consumer to choose the
brand be compromised? The value to a firm of their brand equity, or loss
thereof, is substantial and is of paramount importance to the ongoing
concem. 5 To mitigate this risk, franchisors require their franchisee partners
to sign long, complex contracts in which the franchisees promise to uphold
brand standards (e.g., the prescribed type of TV in a hotel room, a standard
of cleanliness, and/or quality of the product). Franchisees who fail to
comply with these brand standards are generally given a period of time to
cure the defect and to comply with the contractual terms, or the franchisees
can have their agreements terminated, risking "losing" the franchise.
Franchisees also face risk. Franchisees are responsible for all of the
initial capital expenses-money that is lost if the business fails or if the
franchisor eventually terminates the contract. Of course, failed franchises
or franchises that are terminated have the effect of making the franchisors
appear less appealing business partners to new franchisees. For the reasons
above, the relationships are symbiotic; both sides are invested in each other
and truly want the franchise to succeed.
Franchising has been part of the industrial culture since the 1800s,
when Isaac Singer, of sewing machine fame, realized he could not sell and
service his patented machines nationwide by himself. He therefore "sold"
franchises to local employers. 6 The world's most famous franchisor is
probably Ray Kroc, a milkshake machine salesman who went into business
with, and ultimately purchased the name and concept from the McDonald
brothers, who owned several hamburger restaurants.7 Since that time, other
restaurants, hotels, car repair shops, health clubs, and numerous other
businesses have used franchising as a method for expanding their
businesses in terms of the number of units, revenue, and profits. The
International Franchising Association estimates that as of January 2015
there were over 781,794 franchised establishments operating across
5. See Kevin L. Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer
Based Brand Equity, 57 J. OF MKT. 1, 8-9 (1993). See generally Vijay Mahajan et al.,
An Approach to Assess the Importance of Brand Equity in Acquisition Decisions, 11 J.
PROD. INNOVATION MGMT, 221 (1994). For franchisors, brand equity is the Holy
Grail-it incentivizes franchisees to buy a franchise, it drives consumers to the unit and
thus drives revenue. Brand equity is what the franchisor creates, maintains, and sells.
6. See Andrew B. Jack, The Channels of Distribution For an Innovation: The
Sewing-Machine Industry in America, 1860-1865, 9 EXPLORATIONS IN
ENTREPRENEURIAL HIST. 113 (1957).
7. See generally Claudio Vignali, McDonald's: "think global, act local" - the
marketing mix, 103 BRITISH FOOD J. 97 (2001).
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numerous sectors of the U.S. economy. 8  Moreover, franchising has
become a vehicle for entrepreneurs seeking to mitigate risk and improve
profitability. 9  Due to its attractiveness, franchising has become an
enormous employer of workers, as well as an important source of tax
revenue. According to estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau, franchisees
employ 7.9 million employees and are responsible for $153.7 billion in
total payroll, as well as $1.3 trillion in total sales.'
0
The reason why parties franchise has been the subject of numerous
academic studies, and a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, it is important to quickly address "the why." From the
franchisee's standpoint, the motivation for franchising can be readily
identified and understood. Franchising reduces the franchisee's risk
because of the brand's value to the consumer, the network of support, and
the services provided (advertising, hotel reservation systems, loyalty
programs etc.). Indeed, financial performances of independent businesses
are significantly lower than those of comparable businesses that are
franchisees."' Also, the probability of financial failure has been shown to
be lower for firms that franchise versus those that operate as independent
businesses.
1 2
For the perspective of the franchisor, the reason for franchising is more
complex. At its most basic level, academics have identified two primary
motivations for franchising: "capital scarcity" and "agency conflict."
Capital scarcity is easy to understand since franchisees use their own (or
borrowed) capital and they assume the financial risks. Thus, the
franchisors can expand their brands without raising and risking their own
capital. Agency conflict is more complicated. Given the existence of
8. See Franchise Business Outlook for 2015, INT'L FRANCHISE ASSOc. 1, 2 (Jan.
2015), http://emarket.franchise.org/FranchiseBizOutlook2015.pdf
9. See generally Patrick J. Kaufmann, Franchising and the Choice of Self
Employment, 14 J. BUS. VENTURING 345 (1999); Russell M. Knight, The Independence
of the Franchisee Entrepreneur, 22 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 53 (1984).
10. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2007 ECONOMIC CENSUS
FRANCHISE REPORT http://www.census.gov/econ/census/pdf/franchiseflyer.pdf. (last
visited Nov. 15, 2015).
11. See Melih Madanoglu et al., Franchising and firm financial performance among
U.S. restaurants, 87 J. OF RETAILING 406 (2011) (comparing the risk adjusted financial
performance of restaurant firms that were franchised and non-franchised between 1995-
2008 using five commonly employed financial performance measures. For each
measure, franchising restaurant firms outperformed their non-franchising
counterparts.).
12. See Paul Ingram & Joel A. C. Baum, Chain Affiliation and the Failure of
Manhattan Hotels, 1898-1980, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 68 (1997) (finding that, under most
circumstances, chain affiliation improved the chances of survival for 558 hotels that
operated in Manhattan between 1898 and 1980).
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conflict in goals between principals and agents, at least three agency
problems may exist when combined under the conditions of incomplete
information and uncertainty: 1) moral hazard, where the principal will not
be able to ensure that maximum effort is put forth by the agent; 2) adverse
selection, whereby the principal may have difficulty assessing and ensuring
the agent's quality; and 3) hold-up, where one or both parties will act
opportunistically. 13 At its most basic level, agency conflict, in this context,
stands for the proposition that, because franchisees are owner/managers,
they will be more invested in the efficient and profitable operation of the
business than company employees of the franchisor, and thus, they will
work harder, be more honest, and do a better job. Furthermore, franchisees
are, in the theory, local owners who know the idiosyncrasies of their local
market better than the national franchisor and can better understand and
serve the local consumer. The franchisor, however, must endure the cost of
constantly monitoring franchisees to ensure they comply with their
contracts and do not engage in opportunistic behavior that may benefit
them at the expense of the franchisor and the brand. This Article considers
much of the traditional agency conflict arguments unhelpful because they
provide conflicting motivations regarding the tendency to franchise and do
not reflect the modem realities of the franchise business environment.
First, it is not at all clear that franchisee owners will work harder than
"company managers" seeking to move up the corporate ladder. Both types
of managers have incentives to do the best they can, but the franchisee's
manager's interests are often less aligned with the brand than are the
company's own employee managers. This is the case for two reasons.
First, there is a difference in what the franchisors and franchisees value:
franchisees benefit from profits, while franchisors benefit from the unit's
gross revenue. Second, the franchisee may not be as loyal to the brand as
are the company's managers. In the modem world, many franchisees
operate numerous brands. Indeed, there are several large hotel franchisees
that own and operate Hilton, Marriott, and Choice brand hotels. It stands to
reason that managers of hotels who work for these large franchisees,
seeking to rise in the organization, will be more loyal to the franchisee
company than the brands that they currently manage. Conversely, a
manager who works for the brand must value and protect that brand. Unit-
level managers who do not protect the brand are easily fired, while
franchisees and their managers can free-ride off those who protect the
brand and while skimping on brand standards. Company-owned units,
therefore, are likely to have lower monitoring costs than franchised outlets,
13. See Scott Shane, Explaining the Distribution of Franchised and Company-
Owned Outlets in Franchise Systems, 24 J. OF MGMT. 717, 717-39 (1998).
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especially when the franchisee is a multi-unit owner.
With regard to local ties and local owners, the world has changed.
Among large franchise organizations, there are numerous franchisees that
operate literally hundreds of franchisees. For example, Carrols Restaurants
Group Inc., after a recent $15.8 million transaction, owned a total of 575
Burger King Outlets across the United States, making it the system's
largest single owner.' 4  Similarly, eighty-eight percent of McDonald's
owners own more than one store, with the average franchisee owning about
five outlets. 15 The owners of these franchises are not necessarily "on the
ground," and they do not necessarily have any more specific local
knowledge than does the national franchisor. Instead, they are now, more
than ever, large corporations with general managers, regional managers,
legal staffs, human resource departments, and the entire range of corporate
complexities that are not much different than the franchisor's own
corporate structure, including the same concerns relating to agency
conflicts and managerial shirking. The motivation to franchise, certainly
among the larger brands, has clearly shifted due to some of the following
factors: 1) the growth of multi-unit large corporate ownership; 2) the
homogenization of the American consumer that has taken away, in many
product categories, the need for local knowledge; 3) the availability of
capital for large brands (whether they franchise or not); and 4) the company
run units have similar or even lower brand monitoring costs than franchised
outlets. Thus, the motivation has shifted toward a different paradigm:
"capital agency."
The idea behind capital agency is simple: 1) it takes substantial time and
the use of capital and other firm resources to operate a business; and 2)
franchisors would rather focus on their brands, and the market value of the
brand equity derived from it, than on day-to-day operations. The franchisor
does not want to invest in the infrastructure to manage hundreds or
thousands of employees and properties. Instead, it wants to offload that
task to another party: in this case, the franchisee. For instance, there is
evidence of this throughout the quick service restaurant industry as
companies like McDonald's and Burger King are decreasing the number of
owned units. As explained above, contrary to agency conflict theory, the
franchisors are not motivated toward a choice between company-owned
and franchised units because they believe that the franchisee will have an
14. Angus Loten, The Big Get Bigger, WALL ST. J., (May 18, 2012, 2:04PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 1000142405270230472330457737043158923 1276?alg
-y,
15. 2015 Franchise 500: McDonald's At A Glance, ENTREPRENEUR MAG. (2015),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/mcdonalds/282570-0.html (last visited Nov.
17,2015).
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owner on the ground who will be more invested in the brand than a
company manager would be.
Instead, our capital agency theory is based on focus, know-how, cost,
and risk. Franchisors are experts in brand management. Brand
management is a different skill-set than human resource, property, and
operational management. The brands recognize this as does Wall Street.
Wall Street has long favored hotel companies that do not own real estate (a
reason why most publicly traded hotel companies no longer own their
hotels), and Wall Street is even more favorable to franchisors who, in
addition to having no risk of infrastructure exposure and capital expenses,
now have limited management expenses and no employee and tort liability
associated with owning and operating the businesses. The franchisor
contracts with a franchisee to operate the business. If the franchisee is a
single-unit operator, the franchisor hopes that the personal incentive will
lead to top performance. If the franchisee is a large company, the
franchisor is trusting its brand to an operating expert. Regardless, the
franchisor is allowed to greatly limit its focus on operating infrastructure
and liability. This Article, therefore, argues that capital agency is the
logical driver of the franchise model; unless, of course, the law changes,
and capital agency is no longer possible.
II. THE JOINT-EMPLOYER DOCTRINE
The reason that the franchisor/franchisee relationship is now at issue
is that the NLRB, the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"), the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and plaintiffs' lawyers
are bringing employment related lawsuits against franchisors on behalf of
franchisee employees. The franchisors' response has been, predictably, to
contend that they are not the employer and that they should not be a party
to such actions. The administrative agencies listed above, as well as the
plaintiffs' lawyers, state this contention by arguing that the franchisee and
franchisor are together "joint employers," which means that the employee
has two (or more) employers responsible for any employer obligations and
liabilities. The question is simple: when are two or more entities "joint
employers"? The answer is complex for two reasons. First, different
agencies apply different tests, and thus, there are different standards across
statutes. Second, as in all areas of administrative law, the agencies often
push to change standards. Thus, our country has different standards
between statutes and agencies, and agencies are attempting to change the
laws that they enforce. Below, this Article tries to make sense of the legal
side of the joint-employer doctrine.
In the employment context, there are three different administrative
agencies whose use of the joint-employer doctrine is relevant to employers
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on a day-to-day basis: the EEOC (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII"), 16 Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 7 and
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA");18 the DOL (the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA");' 9 and the NLRB (the NLRA). 20 As stated above,
each agency employs a somewhat different test to determine joint-employer
liability.
A. The Joint-Employer Standard under Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 As It Applies to Franchising
Title VII imposes liability for employment discrimination on "the
employer," who is defined by the statute as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding year, and any agent of such a person.'
With regard to franchising in Title VII cases, "[a] franchisor is not a joint
employer unless it has significant control over the employment
relationship. 22  Under this standard, a franchisor is considered a joint
employer only if the franchisor exercises significant actual control over
employees' terms and conditions of employment.23
For example, in McFarland v. Breads of World, the court found no joint-
employer relationship between a franchisor and franchisee because the
franchisor showed that "it played no role at all in [the franchisee's]
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (2015).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2015).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262.
20. Id. §§ 151-169.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); see also Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d
1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d
1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982)) (describing the term "employer" as "sufficiently broad to
encompass any party who significantly affects access of any individual to employment
opportunities, regardless of whether the party may technically be described as an
'employer' . . . at common law"); Lima v. Addeco, 634 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (citing Goodwin v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 0207(WCC),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42466, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2005)) ("The definition of
'employer' has been construed liberally for Title VII purposes 'and does not require a
direct employer/employee relationship.').
22. Courtland v. CGEP-Surprise, LLC, No. CV-12-00349-PHX-GMS, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105780, at *7-9 (D. Ariz. July 29, 2013) (finding that no employment
relationship existed because the franchisor had independence in making employment
decisions. The court reached its determination after evaluating the nature and degree of
control that the entities had over the employees, including an assessment of who
supervised their work, who determined their compensation, who paid them, and who
had the right to hire or fire them.).
23. Id.
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA W REVIEW
employee relations issues." 24 The plaintiff was employed by Breads of the
World, a franchisee that owned and operated several Panera Bread stores,
including the one where the plaintiff worked. 25 Both Panera Bread and the
franchisee were named as defendants in this case in which the plaintiff
alleged that he was terminated because he opposed discriminatory hiring
practices.26  On a motion to dismiss, the court considered whether the
franchisor should be considered the plaintiff's employer by virtue of the
franchisor/franchisee relationship between the two entities.27 Although the
court noted that "courts have been nearly uniform in holding that a
franchisor should not be deemed an 'employer' for purposes of Title VII
when the plaintiff works for an independently owned franchise," it
cautioned that "the mere existence of a franchisor/franchisee contract does
not insulate the franchisor from liability." 28 Based on the facts presented,
the court held that the franchisor was not a joint employer because it
offered unrebutted evidence that it played "no role at all in Breads'
employee relations issues, including, but not limited to, the day-to-day
supervision of Breads' employees."
29
Similarly, in Courtland v. GCEP-Surprise, LLC, franchisor Buffalo Wild
Wings maintained more than 470 franchised restaurants around the
country. 30 The plaintiff, who alleged sex discrimination and harassment,
was hired, trained on employment matters, supervised, and ultimately
terminated by the local franchisee. 31 In considering whether the franchisor
and franchisee were joint employers for Title VII purposes, the court
looked to the nature and degree of control of the workers; the degree of
supervision of the work; the power to determine pay rates or methods of
payment of the workers; the right to hire, fire, or modify the employment
conditions of the workers; and the preparation of payroll and the payment
of wages.3 2 The franchisee was responsible for hiring, firing, supervising,
and training employees.33 The franchisor was not involved with human
resources ("HR") matters nor did it influence the conduct of the
24. McFarland v. Breads of the World, LLC, No. 1:09-cv-929, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20703, at *31 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1,2011).
25. Id. at *17.
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id. at *20.
28. Id. at *20-21.
29. Id. at*31.
30. Courtland v. CGEP-Surprise, LLC, No. CV-12-00349-PHX-GMS, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105780, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 29, 2013).
31. Id.
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id. at *4.
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restaurant's daily operations. 34 Noting that "[a] franchisor is not a joint
employer unless it has significant control over the employment
relationship," the court found that no joint-employer relationship existed.35
Some courts have found, on the facts presented, significant enough ties
between a franchisor and franchisee so as to create a joint-employer
relationship. The plaintiff in Myers v. Garfield & Johnson Enterprises, Inc.
worked as a tax preparer at Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc. ("Jackson
Hewitt"), where as an employee, she received the "Jackson Hewitt Code of
Conduct" that prohibited harassment and discrimination in the workplace,
completed training modules prepared by Jackson Hewitt, used Jackson
Hewitt's intranet site, and interacted with Jackson Hewitt employees.
36
The Jackson Hewitt office, where the plaintiff worked, was a franchise
operated by Garfield & Johnson Enterprises, Inc.37 The plaintiff was paid
by the franchisee and not by Jackson Hewitt. 38 According to the allegations
in the complaint, Jackson Hewitt had the authority to promulgate work
rules, set the conditions of employment, require the franchisee's managers
to submit to training and obey employment laws, and require its franchisees
codes of conduct to terminate employees in certain circumstances. 39 The
complaint also alleged that Jackson Hewitt participated in the daily
supervision of Garfield & Johnson employees and that it assumed some
degree of control over its employee records.40 Although Jackson Hewitt
did not pay the plaintiff, the court found that ties between the franchisor
and franchisee were sufficient to deny the franchisor's motion to dismiss
sexual harassment claims.4 '
B. The Joint-Employer Standard under the Fair Labor Standards Act
Under the FLSA, an "employer"' is defined as "any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. 4 2  The FLSA defines "employ" as "to suffer or permit to
work.",43 This is considered among the broadest definitions of "employ"
that has ever been included in any legislation, and encompasses working
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Myers v. Garfield & Johnson Enter., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600-601 (E.D.
Pa. 2010).
37. Id. at 600-01.
38. Id. at 601.
39. Id. at610.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 609-10.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2015).
43. Id. § 203(g).
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relationships that, prior to the FLSA, were not deemed to fall within an
employer-employee category. 4 Title VII's definition of an employer is
"much narrower" than the FLSA's definition.4 5
There are significant implications under the FLSA to a finding that a
joint-employer relationship exists. The DOL has explained, in its
regulations, that when "employment by one employer is not completely
disassociated from employment by the other employer(s), all of the
employee's work for all of the joint employers during the workweek is
considered as one employment for purposes of the [FLSA]. 46  Joint
employers thus "are responsible, both individually and jointly" for
compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the statute, including
overtime provisions. 47 This is a basic and significant distinction between
the FLSA and Title VII. As described above, joint employment under Title
VII will not cause one employer to become vicariously liable for the
discriminatory acts of another entity; each employer remains liable only for
48its own actions.
As under Title VII, the existence of a franchisor-franchisee relationship
does not automatically establish a joint-employer relationship in FLSA
cases. Instead, courts will scrutinize the relationships between franchisors
and employees of franchisees using the economic reality test.49  The
44. Cordova v. SCCF. Inc., No. 13CV05665-LTS-HBP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97390, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014).
45. Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 415 n.6 (3d
Cir. 2012).
46. 29 C.F.R. 791.2(a) (2015).
47. Id.
48. See Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2014)
("[E]stablishing a 'joint employer' relationship does not create liability in the co-
employer for actions taken by the other employer."); see also Torres-Negron v. Merck
& Co., 488 F.3d 34, 41 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[J]oint-employer liability does not by itself
implicate vicarious liability [ .... ] [A] finding that two companies are an employee's
'joint employers' only affects each employer's liability to the employee for their own
actions, not for each other's actions [ .... ]").
49. See, e.g., Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 2582 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2012);
Orozco v. Plackis, No. A-I l CV-703 LY, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91916, at *21 (W.D.
Tex. July 3, 2012); see also Chen v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 09-107 (JAP), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96362, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2009) ("Courts have consistently held
that the franchisor/franchisee relationship does not create an employment relationship
between a franchisor and a franchisee's employees."). The Chen case cited other cases
exploring franchisor/franchisee relationships. See generally Abdelkhaleq v. Precision
Door, No. 5:07CV03585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64464, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21,
2008) ("[T]he shared right to use the brand name of a manufacturer or distributor
between a franchisor and a franchisee does not make the two a single entity for
purposes of FLSA."); Marshall v. Shan-An-Dan, Inc., 747 F.2d 1084, 1088-89 (6th
Cir. 1984); Howell v. Chick-Fil-A, Inc., No. 92-30188-RV, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19030, at *15 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 1993) (explaining that the owner/operator of a fast
food franchise is not an employee of the franchisor, therefore, employees of the
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economic reality test generally examines whether the defendant exercised
"control" over each individual plaintiffs' work,5 ° courts generally look to
four factors: whether the putative employer (i) had the power to hire and
fire the employees; (ii) supervised and controlled work schedules or
conditions of employment; (iii) determined the rate and method of
payment; and (iv) maintained employment records. 51 No one factor is
determinative, and courts look at the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether an entity has enough control to make it a joint
employer.52
For example, in Olvera v. Bareburger Group LLC, the defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint alleging violations of the FLSA on the basis that
no employment relationship existed between the franchisor and the
franchisee's employees.53 Using the economic reality test, the court
pointed to factual allegations that the franchisor defendants guided
franchisees on how to hire and train employees; set and enforced
requirements for the operations of franchises; monitored employee
performance; specified the methods and procedures used by those
employees to prepare customer orders; exercised control over the work of
employees; required franchises to employ recordkeeping of operations; and
exercised control over their franchisees' timekeeping and payroll records.
54
The court found that these allegations were sufficient to state a plausible
claim that the franchisor defendants were the plaintiffs' joint employers
under the FLSA.55
On the other hand, in Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., the court found no
employment relationship between a franchisor and franchisee when the
franchisor retained no control over the store's day-to-day operations.56 The
plaintiff alleged that he was not properly paid for all hours worked and that
both the franchisor and franchisee bore responsibility for the miscalculated
payments.57 Applying the economic reality test, the court found that the
franchisor was not a joint employer of the plaintiff because there was no
evidence that it exercised any control or influence over any terms and
owner/operator are likewise not employees of the franchisor).
50. See Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing Carter v. Duchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984)).
51. Id.
52. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 71 n.8 (2d Cir. 2003).
53. Olvera v. Bareburger Grp. LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
54. Id. at 207.
55. Id.
56. Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 5 Civ. 4534, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16677, at *18
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007).
57. Id. at *4-5.
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conditions of employment, including hiring and firing practices, and that
the franchisee controlled work schedules.58  With respect to the
determination of the rate and method of payment and the maintenance of
employment records, the plaintiff claimed that 7-Eleven Inc. ("7-Eleven")
had control over payroll functions such as keeping and generating time
records; withholding and paying federal and state taxes, worker's
compensation premiums; delivering paychecks; filing returns; and
providing employees with annual W-2s. 59 The court held that 7-Eleven's
control over "these ministerial functions" did not establish an employment
relationship. 60  Because 7-Eleven was not using its own funds to pay
plaintiff wages or employment benefits, no joint-employer relationship
existed.
6 1
C. Browning-Ferris and the Future of the Definition of "Joint Employer"
under the NLRA and the Other Labor and Employment Laws
For the past three decades the NLRB has determined whether two
separate entities are joint employers by assessing whether they exert such
direct and significant control over the same employees that they "share or
codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment [ .... ], 62 The Board has long applied this analysis by
evaluating whether a putative joint employer "meaningfully affects matters
relating to the employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline,
supervision, and direction" and whether the entity's control over such
matters is direct and immediate. 63  This decades-old standard affords
58. Id. at *11-16.
59. Id. at *17.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798 (1984); Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269
N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984).
63. Airborne Freight Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 (2002) (citing Laerco Transp., 269
N.L.R.B. at 325; see TLI Inc., 271 NLRB at 798 (citing Laerco Transp., 269 N.L.R.B.
324 (1984)); see also SEIU Local 32BJ v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 435, 443 (2d Cir. 2011)
(finding that supervision which is "limited and routine" in nature does not support a
joint-employer finding, and that supervision is generally considered "limited and
routine" where a "supervisor's instructions consist primarily of telling employees what
work to perform, or where and when to perform the work, but not how to perform the
work") (citation omitted); Holyoke Visiting Nurses Ass'n v. NLRB, 11 F.3d 302, 307
(1st Cir. 1993) (finding joint-employer status where the putative joint employer had
"unfettered" power to refuse to hire certain employees, monitored the performance of
referred employees; assumed day-to-day supervisory control over such employees,
gave such employees their daily assignments, reports, supplies, and directions; and held
itself out as the party whom employees could contact if they encountered a problem
during the work day); Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985)
(finding joint-employer status where the putative joint employer "exercised substantial
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companies stability and predictability and allows for effective collective
bargaining between unions and the employer that actually sets the terms
and conditions of employment.
In 2014, in BFI, the NLRB invited briefing on whether to alter its long-
64
established "direct control" standard. Multiple briefs were submitted
addressing whether the Board should adhere to the established standard
and, if not, what standard the Board should adopt.
The General Counsel of the NLRB submitted an amicus brief in
Browning-Ferris urging that the Board adopt a joint-employer standard that
would "make no distinction between direct, indirect, and potential control
over working conditions and would find joint-employer status where
'industrial realities' make an entity essential for meaningful bargaining.,
65
The General Counsel's brief argued that this expansive test for joint-
employer status was necessary because collective bargaining
representatives must be capable of addressing their employment conditions
with the entity that has the power to implement those terms. 66 The theory
is that the exercise of limited control, or even potential control, relevant to
even one aspect of an employee's conditions of employment is enough to
establish a joint-employer relationship because such a determination would
necessitate the putative joint employer's presence at the bargaining table.6 7
The EEOC and DOL similarly became interested in more expansive
approaches to the joint-employer standard. In an amicus brief filed in the
Browning-Ferris case, the EEOC advocated for a broad and flexible
definition of "joint employer." 68 The brief quoted the EEOC Compliance
Manual, which states that "[t]he term 'joint employer' refers to two or more
employers that are unrelated or that are not sufficiently related to qualify as
an integrated enterprise, but that each exercise sufficient control of an
individual to qualify as his/her employer." 69 The EEOC argued that factors
day-to-day control over the drivers' working conditions," was consulted "over wages
and fringe benefits for the drivers," and "had the authority to reject any driver that did
not meet its standards" and to direct the actual employer to "remove any driver whose
conduct was not in [the putative joint employer's] best interests").
64. See generally Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015).
65. Amicus Brief of the General Counsel at 17, Browning-Ferris Indus. Inc. 362
N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015) (No. 32-RC-109684), http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.asp
x/0903 1d45817b e83.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Amicus Brief of the EEOC at 5-11, Browning-Ferris Indus. Inc. 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 186 (2015) (No. 32-RC- 109684), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigationibriefs/brown
ing.html#_ftn1.
69. See Special Issues Regarding Multiple Entities: Joint Employers, 2 EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2-II1(B)(1)(a)(iii)(b) (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/pol
icy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1 [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL]; see also
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derived from common law principles of agency should be applied in
determining whether entities exercise sufficient control over employees to
establish a joint-employer relationship. 70 In applying these factors, the
EEOC suggested that the relevant criteria include who hires and fires, who
assigns work, who controls daily activities, who furnishes equipment,
where work is performed, who pays the employee, who provides employee
benefits, how the worker is treated for tax purposes, and whether the
worker and the putative employer believe that they are creating an
employer-employee relationship.7'
The EEOC brief stated that "[i]n light of the remedial purposes of Title
VII and the NLRA, the EEOC's joint-employer definition more accurately
reflects congressional intent than the Board's definition. 72  Varied
workplace relationships, in which the increasing "contracting-out of work
is blurring . . . distinctions between employer and client contractor," require
a flexible definition of joint employer.73 The EEOC urged the NLRB to
accept its flexible approach and to abandon the "direct and immediate
control" analysis currently used by the Board.
Dr. David Weil, the Wage and Hour Division ("WHD") Administrator at
the DOL since May 2014, authored a report in 2010 in which he described
his view of the joint-employer standard. In the report to the WHD titled
Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic Enforcement: Report
to the Wage and Hour Division ("WHD Report") Dr. Weil called for
clarification of the meaning of joint employment. 74
In describing the characteristics of industries that make workers
vulnerable to violations of labor standards, workplace safety, and other
rights in the workplace, the WHD Report points to the "fissuring" of the
employment relationship as a cause of such problems. 75 "Fissuring" arises
EEOC Notice from Gilbert Casellas, Chairman, EEOC, EEOC Enforcement Guidance:
Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment
Agencies and Other Staffing Firms (Dec. 3, 1997) (on file at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/conting.html) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement
Guidance] ("[A]ll of the circumstances in the worker's relationship with each of the
businesses should be considered to determine if either or both should be deemed his or
her employer.").
70. See Amicus Brief of the General Counsel supra note 66, at 10, n. 17.
71. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 69, § 2-1II(A)(l), n.71 (citing
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992)).
72. See Amicus Brief of the EEOC, supra note 68, at 11.
73. Id. (quoting Airborne Freight Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (2002) (Member
Liebman, concurring)).
74. See DAVID WELL, REP. TO DEP'T OF LABOR: WAGE & HOUR DIV., IMPROVING
WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 4 (May 2010),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicenforcement.pdf.
75. Id. at 18.
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in industries where large companies have delegated away employment and
the responsibility to oversee the workforce to smaller businesses.76 The
WHD Report points to specific industries-such as retail, construction, and
manufacturing-with high percentages of low-wage workers.77 Although it
addressed a variety of factors that may contribute to why "vulnerable"
workers may be concentrated in specific industries, the WHD Report
pointed to the structure of these industries as a direct cause of workforce
vulnerability. 78  The employment relationship, according to the WHD
Report, has shifted from large employers to a number of fragmented
smaller employers, by way of franchising, subcontracting, and other related
forms. These smaller entities are pressured to keep their costs as low as
possible to offer low prices in a competitive market.79 As a result, the
worker-employer relationship is not clear.80
The WHD Report recommended that the WHD "seek to clarify joint
employment in the many industries and sectors where the locus of
employment has blurred." 81 Noting that there is a need to redefine joint
employment as new employment contexts arise, the WHD Report
recommended bringing significant cases that will require courts to consider
and clarify the boundaries of employment in major industries and also in
various organizational forms (e.g., franchising and third-party
management).82
The WHD Report also recommended that the WHD pursue litigation
based on evidence of systemic violations across different owners linked by
a common brand or high-level entity as a means of establishing joint-
employer responsibility.83 For example, according to the WHD Report,
franchises, which are generally viewed as the direct and sole employer of
workers, should be reexamined to determine whether the franchisor/
franchisee relationship is in truth a "joint venture" due to the close
relationship between the entities.84 The WHD Report specifically noted
that the WHD and Office of the Solicitor should coordinate closely "in
pursuing the ambitious litigation agenda directed towards clarifying joint
employment and related questions involving employer responsibility under
76. Id. at 19.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 20-21.
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id. at 79.
82. Id. at 80.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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the FLSA."85
D. Employment and Labor Laws Differ
Title VII, the FLSA, and the NLRA all serve different purposes. Title
VII aims to address discrimination in the workplace. The statute imposes
liability for employment discrimination on an "employer," defined as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such a person."8 6 The
joint-employer test under Title VII is rather inexact, focusing on control
87
over general employment matters. In Title VII cases, if discriminatory
acts occur and two or more entities constitute joint employers, only the
entity responsible for those acts will be held liable.88 In one section of the
EEOC Compliance Manual, it provides guidance addressing joint-employer
relationships and suggests that the purpose of joint-employer status in the
context of discrimination claims is to make an entity other than the
principal employer liable for conduct relating to a specific employee. 89
The EEOC Compliance Manual, which was written for the context of
temporary employment agencies sending employees to clients, specifically
addresses whether an agency can be responsible for its client's
discriminatory acts.90  According to the EEOC, the firm is liable if it
participates in the client's discrimination. For example, if the firm honors
its client's request to remove a worker from a job assignment for a
discriminatory reason and replace him or her with an individual outside the
worker's protected class, the firm is liable for the discriminatory discharge.
The firm also is liable if it knew or should have known about the client's
discrimination and failed to undertake prompt corrective measures within
its control.9'
Courts, addressing situations where one of the multiple employers
engaged in discriminatory conduct, therefore, will hold liable only those
entities responsible for the wrongful conduct.
92
Under the FLSA, by contrast, the issue is whether a putative joint
employer may be held liable for violations of the minimum wage and hour
85. Id at 90.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (2015).
87. See supra pp. 12-21.
88. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cnty., 772 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2014).
89. See id at 811-12. See generally EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL supra note 69.
90. See generally EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 69.
91. See id. (emphasis added).
92. See Courtland v. GCEP-Sunrise, No. CV-12-00349-PHX-GMS, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 105780, *8-9 (D. Ariz. July 29, 2013).
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laws. The statutory language of the FLSA defines "employer" to include
anyone acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee, as well as the Congressional purpose of the Act,
and it reflects the legal obligation to pay employees fairly. 93 In both of
these employment law contexts, joint-employer status bears on economic
concerns, should the entity become liable for wrongful conduct. Thus,
while the joint employer may become retroactively liable for wrongful
conduct, joint-employer status does not necessarily saddle the employer
with any prospective, affirmative obligations.
Under the NLRA, however, the joint-employer inquiry has an entirely
different purpose. Joint-employer status compels a putative joint employer
to undertake myriad duties and responsibilities required under the Act:
including collective bargaining and its attendant responsibilities (where the
entity establishing the terms and conditions of employment is the direct
employer). The NLRA is distinct from other employment laws because it
establishes these broad, prospective obligations; a joint employer under the
NLRA will be subject to numerous legal obligations, whereas a joint
employer under Title VII or the FLSA will have mainly economic
responsibilities in relation to its joint-employer status. It is under this
backdrop that this Article examines the Board's recent BFI decision.
III. BROWNING-FERRIS
BFI is a case about employee leasing/temporary employees and not
franchising. This distinction should not, however, lead one to believe that
the issues are mutually exclusive and that the holding is not relevant to the
franchisor/franchisee/employee relationship. The joint-employer test under
the NLRB has never made a distinction between temporary employees and
franchisee employees. It is possible, of course, that the Administrative
Law Judge ("AL") will distinguish the two issues. Thus, this Article
examines the BFI decision, knowing it applies to the temporary employees
while expecting it will be applied to franchising.
As stated above, in determining joint-employer status, the Board's
choice in BFI seemed to be whether 1) to follow the test of the last thirty
years and require proof that the putative employer exerted direct and
significant control over employees;94 or 2) to return to a prior test and find
such status if the putative employer simply reserved the right to exercise
such control. The Board went with the latter definition. If applied in the
broader context, this seemingly innocuous difference can have a
93. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (1984).
94. See TLI Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798-99 (1984); Laerco Transp. & Warehouse,
269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984).
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tremendous effect on the franchise industry. The Board's explanation of
this new standard has three major problems: 1) it is near impossible to
figure out; 2) in application, it expands the joint-employer definition; and
3) it creates perverse incentives.
A. The Standard Is Unclear
There is a threshold issue under the new test. Is the putative employer an
employer under the common law definition of employer? Such a
determination is, according to the Board, not always a simple task.
95
Indeed, the Board recommends looking to the 1958 Restatement (Second)
of Agency ("Restatement") for guidance.96 The Restatement provides that
"a servant is person employed to perform services in the affairs of another
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control. 9 7 Clearly, this
1958 standard is nearly impossible to operationalize. To make matters
worse, this standard is necessary, but it is not sufficient to establish joint-
employer status. The next step, according to the Board, is control. The
Board, however, does not define control. Indeed, in response to the
dissent's criticism of this inexact test, the Board states the following:
[W]e do not and cannot attempt to today to articulate every fact and
circumstance that could define the contours of a joint employment
relationship. Issues related to the nature of a putative joint employer's
control over-particular terms and conditions of employment will
undoubtedly arise in future cases-just as they do under the current
test-and those issues are best examined and resolved in the context of
specific factual circumstances. In this area of labor law, as in others,
"'the nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations'
requires 'an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick,
definitive formula as a comprehensive answer.'
98
The Board continued stating that "[t]oday's decision, however, makes it
clear that 'all of incidents of the relationship must be assessed"' and that its
conclusion that BFI is a joint employer is based on a "full assessment of the
facts." 99 This is a long way of saying that the joint-employer status will be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
The amorphous standard is not a piece of our imagination. The Board
explains that it is probative if a putative employer retains the right to reject
or terminate employees, set wage rates, set working hours, approve
95. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 18 (2015).
96. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
97. Id. § 220.
98. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. at 16.
99. Id.
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overtime, dictate the number of employees to be supplied, determine the
manner and method of work performance, inspect and approve work, and
terminate the contract at will.' 00
In a vacuum, the Board's statement does not seem so problematic
because law develops through cases, and cases are decided on facts. In
context, the Board's statement that "uncertainty is acceptable" is
unworkable because 1) it applies to too large a percentage of the economy;
and 2) its effects can define the business.
The Board notes that temporary employment is one of the largest- and
fastest-growing industries in terms of employment.' 0 Indeed, by 2022,
there will be an estimated 4 million temporary workers.10 2  Similarly,
franchising is a large and growing component of the economy, accounting
for more than 8.569 million employees today with estimates that
employment growth in the franchise sector will continue to outpace the
growth of employment in all businesses economy-wide."' Whether an
employer is a joint employer has significant tangible consequences. A
franchisor who is not a joint employer cannot enter card-check neutrality
with a union (and will not be susceptible to a union's corporate campaign),
cannot be picketed, has no obligation to reply to an unfair labor practice,
and will not have to bargain with a union. An employer who has such
obligations has every incentive to create a sophisticated HR department,
will provide training to ensure NLRA compliance, and may create a union-
avoidance strategy. An employer who is not a joint employer will avoid all
such activities, as such could be seen as evidence of joint-employer status.
Such a distinction and certainty could be the driver as to whether a nascent
owner/operator franchisor would, in fact, decide to enter into the field of
franchising and seek out others for franchise arrangements.
Uncertainty seems like a chamber of commerce/conservative euphemism
for being anti-regulation, anti-progressive, and anti-tax. The previous
statement is not this Article's argument. Because temporary workers and
franchisees' employees are a rising aspect of the workforce, the Board
wants such employees to be able to unionize. The Board has the power to
define joint employment, and then, it should define it. Parties may litigate
over it, but setting a standard, that will need decades to define, and
100. Id. at9.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Richard Henderson, Industry Employment and Output Projections to 2022,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW (December 2013),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/industry-employment-and-output-
projections-to-2022.htm.
103. Franchise Business Economic Outlook Infographic, INT'L FRANCHISE ASsOC.
(Jan. 2015), http://emarket.franchise.org/EconomiclnfographicJanuary20 15.pdf.
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claiming that this is the proper way to enforce the law is, at best,
disingenuous and, at worst, dangerous.
B. The New Test Expands the Reach of the Joint-Employer Doctrine
The fact that the Board is resurrecting a 30-year-old test, and that the
EEOC and DOL agree, does not mean that this is not a sea-change in the
American business landscape. Overruling a law that putative employers
relied on and creating a much more liberal test will, of course, lead to more
putative employers being named joint employers. Simply put, the new test
makes reserved rights, which are standard in the vast majority of contracts
and had not resulted in joint-employer status for decades, now
determinative. One need not look any further than BFI. The Regional
Director, applying the old test, found that BFI was not a joint-employer; 0 4
the Board, applying the new test, found BFI was a joint-employer. 10 5 After
the BFI decision, numerous employers all over the country became joint
employers. It is not clear which employers made this exact change.
IV. THE NEW AND OLD TEST RESULT IN HUGE COSTS OR PERVERSE
INCENTIVES
The driver of the joint-employer doctrine is control. Putative
employers that exercise too much control end up with joint-employer
obligations. Knowing this, franchisors have done all they could to ensure
that they did not cross the joint-employer line. They did this by limiting
the control exercised. These limits resulted in tension between operators
and counsel. Counsel wanted to ensure that its franchisor client did not
cross the line. However, operators and managers wanted to preserve the
brand and the business. Now, the line has been moved, and franchisors are
faced with a decision: Should they 1) embrace the joint-employer status; or
2) exercise even less control and suffer the potential market consequences?
Is the BFI standard a positive legal development? What are the
costs? What are the benefits? The benefits are that unions will be able to
engage in top-down organizing, and the EEOC, DOL, and plaintiffs will be
able to sue and collect from franchisors. Before exploring the "costs," this
Article will examine the "benefits" of applying the new test to franchising.
Some of these benefits include 1) increased union organizing; and 2)
deeper pocketed defendants to sue.
A. The Benefits of BFI." Union Organizing
It is beyond the scope of this Article to argue whether unionization is a
104. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 1.
105. See id.
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net gain or loss for the economy. Instead, this Article contends that there is
no evidence that making franchisors joint-employers will increase
unionization. McDonald's, for example, has approximately 1,500
company-owned stores, and none are unionized. 06  Will making
McDonald's a joint-employer result in the approximately 13,500
franchisees unionizing? The SEIU, the union arguing that McDonald's is a
joint employer, seemingly claims that McDonald's' approximately 75,000
"unit" employees are not worth organizing through top-down organizing. 107
Instead, the union will only engage in representation if it can organize
750,000 workers. Unite-Here, the world's largest hotel and restaurant
union, has a total of 270,000 members. The SEIU has approximately 2
million members-half of whom are public employees from municipalities
throughout the country. SEIU also represents healthcare workers like
nurses, doctors, lab technicians, nursing home aides, janitors, and other
employees of office and apartment buildings. °8 It makes no sense to argue
that one union with 270,000 members and another with 2 million members
(from over 100 occupations, who work for many small municipalities and
employers) cannot waste resources on a company with 75,000 employees.
Instead, the NLRB needs to change law and policy so SEIU and Unite-Here
can both organize 750,000 employees. From a theoretical perspective,
mass unionization is speculative. From a practical perspective, it is
unrealistic.
To organize franchisee employees, both the SEIU and Unite-Here would
likely use their preferred method of top-down organizing. Top-down
organizing consists of using leverage to force the employer to sign card-
check neutrality agreements. 0 9 It is worth exploring how this will play out.
106. Steven Greenhouse, Fight For $15: The Strategist Going To War To Make
McDonald's Pay, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/aug/30/fight-for- 15-strategist-mcdonalds-unions.
107. See Lydia DePillis, Why labor groups genuinely believe they can unionize
McDonald's one day, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpo
st.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/08/why-labor-groups-genuinely-believe-they-can-
unionize-mcdonalds-one-day/; see also Bill McMorris, NLRB Opens Door for SEIU at
McDonalds, THE WASH. FREE BEACON (Dec. 19, 2014, 4:25PM),
http://freebeacon.com/issues/nlrb-opens-door-for-seiu-at-mcdonalds/.
108. See generally These fast facts will tell you how we're organized and what we
do, SEIU, http://www.seiu.org/cards/these-fast-facts-will-tell-you-how-were-organized/
(last accessed Dec. 1, 2015).
109. See What is a "Neutrality Agreement " and how does it affect workers?, NAT'L
RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., INC., http://www.nrtw.org/neutrality/na I .htm
(explaining that a "neutrality agreement" is a contract between a union and an
employer under which the employer agrees to support a union's attempt to organize its
workforce. Most neutrality agreements include a "card check" arrangement, in which
employers allow unions to collect cards from workers saying they want a union, rather
than putting the question to a secret vote.); see also Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A
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If the BFI holding is expanded to franchisors, the unions would seek to
force the franchisors to sign such agreements. The franchisors, regardless
of their "control," will claim that they are not joint employers. The union,
as it did with McDonald's, will encourage employees to file unfair labor
practices and allege joint-employer status. The large franchisor may fight
the determination. However, smaller franchisors will not have the
resources and may have to accept the regional directors' determination.
After joint status is adjudicated or accepted, the union will request and/or
demand card-check neutrality. The franchisors will contend they cannot
agree to that, for their current franchisees as they have no such right under
their franchise agreements. The union could begin a corporate campaign
which will feature boycotts, name-calling, threats, and other legal and
ethical as well as arguably unethical or illegal acts. The franchisor may file
a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") action
against the union.1 10 If the franchisor does agree to a neutrality agreement,
the franchisee may either sue or simply refuse to accept the terms of the
neutrality agreement. Litigation over each of these issues will take years.
Even if all of these issues are resolved in the union's favor, the stores
will still be separate bargaining units (maybe several could be considered
one unit), and the union will still need the employees to sign cards to
unionize. The union will then need to convince millions of employees,
within an industry with huge turnover, that they will be better off signing
cards when unionization typically benefits long-term employee units"'
over short-term employees. Moreover, the union's "fight for $15"12 and
other minimum wage initiatives will force employees to question what else
they can get.
The evidence does not support the argument that unions will suddenly be
successful with such a change in the joint-employer standard. Indeed, after
the summer of 2006, Unite-Here secured numerous card-check neutrality
Moral/contractual Approach to Labor Law Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 695, 695-746
(2012).
110. Cf Gregory B. Robertson & Kurt G. Larkin, RICO: A New Tool for Employers
Facing Union Corporate Campaigns?, THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR (May 2009),
https://www.hunton.com/files/Publication!972f4e96-7f57-4a07-b224-3d0edb9d I d86/Pr
esentation/PublicationAttachment/9741 b3 f0-f4ee-4cb2-bbc7-27de4933caea/RICOA_
NewTool_5.09.pdf (applying RICO to corporate campaigns).
11. See generally BENJAMIN 1. SACHS, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 157, (eds. Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L.
Estlund, 2012) (contrasting benefits for long-term and short-term employees).
112. FIGHT FOR $15, http://fightforl5.org/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2015); see e.g.,
Laila Kearney, Protesters rally for higher U.S. fast-food wages, union rights, REUTERS
(Nov. 10, 2015, 9:03PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/20l5/1l / 1/us-usa-wages-
protests-idUSKCNOSZ1KB20151111 #pArpPoSD4EvYMkb5.97 (demanding a $15-
per-hour minimum wage and union rights for certain workers).
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agreements, and pundits predicted that union density in the hotel industry
would rise. 13 Union density did not increase.'1 4 Moreover, this Article
contends the card-check agreements led, in part, to the rise in boutique
hotels that the union has been unable to organize and which led to the rise
of management companies and franchisees who were and still are non-
signatories to card-check contracts. There is simply no evidence that
making franchisors joint-employers will help unionization.
The second benefit of extending BFI to franchising is that DOL, EEOC,
and the plaintiffs' lawyers will be able to sue franchisors for legal
violations. Moreover, Dr. Weil, in his latest paper concludes that
franchisors and large franchisees have a much better level of compliance
with the FLSA than smaller franchisees have." 5 The implication is clear:
make all franchisors joint-employers and increase the levels of compliance.
This theory may work if all franchisors embrace the joint-employer
doctrine. But, will they? What if they do not?
B. The Cost of BFI Applying to Franchising
Franchisors will have to decide whether to embrace joint-employer status
or to exercise less control. This decision will not be done without much
thought and research. It is an empirical question for the company: what
does it cost to be the employer? Some franchisors have company-operated
stores. Such franchisors have extensive HR departments and labor counsel
for company stores, but some franchisors do not have the corporate
structures. Regardless, franchisors devote significantly less resources to
HR and labor counsel for franchisees than firms do for their own
employees. Further, extensive HR and counsel for franchisees' employees
might be evidence of too much control. Companies that accept joint-
employer status and want to ensure legal compliance will have to create
infrastructure for their franchisees. The additional infrastructure building
will result in additional costs without an accompanying revenue stream. In
this case, who will pay? If the franchisor should pay, will the endeavor be
worth it? If the franchisee does, instead, will the franchisee's endeavor be
worth it? In regards to the consumers, how elastic is their demand? What
will happen to profit-sharing, health insurance, and other ERISA plans?
113. Richard W. Hurd, The Origins, Effectiveness and Future of Neutrality
Agreements, CORNELL UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL (2008), http://digitalcommons.ilr.corn
ell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 305&context=articles.
114. MIA GRAY, A HOSPITABLE WORLD?: ORGANISING WORK AND WORKERS IN
HOTELS AND TOURIST RESORTS 181 (eds. David Jordhus-Lier, Anders Underthun,
2015).
115. See generally MinWoong Ji & David Weil, The Impact of Franchising on
Labor Standards Compliance, 68 ILR REV. 977, 991-1 006 (Oct. 2015).
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Will franchisors have to include franchisees' employees in such plans? If
they do not, what will the costs be? Will franchisors eliminate such
employee benefits? The questions can eventually be answered, but they
will take years to be determined. In the meantime, what should franchisors
do?
Franchisors who cannot or will not embrace joint-employer status
now have a perverse incentive to 1) exercise even less control; and 2) only
franchise with established franchisees and no longer work with smaller
entrepreneurs. A franchisor looking to insulate itself should exercise as
little control as possible. Of course, brand standards may be compromised
to the dismay of consumers and operators, but legal liability will be
reduced. The question is the following: who does this new joint-employer
standard help? Will a franchisee's employees be better off if the franchisor
is incentivized to be even further hands-off than they are now? Currently,
franchisors, fearing being accused of exercising too much control, may
advise, but they would never require legal compliance training, sexual
harassment policies, wage and hour audits, and other practices that
sophisticated HR departments provide and that franchisors provide for their
own stores. Now, franchisors will provide even less guidance. Does this
help society? Established businesses, with reputations at stake and deep
pockets to draw upon, will work to ensure legal compliance. Fledgling
franchisees will often have neither the resources nor the knowledge to fully
comply. As proof, there is no better source than Dr. Weil's paper." 6 As
stated, Dr. Weil found that small franchisees violate wage and hour law at a
much greater rate than franchisees with more than 110 outlets (large
franchisees) and franchisors.1 7 Dr. Weil posits a number of reasons for
this phenomenon. Specifically, Dr. Weil contends, franchisors and large
franchisees because they 1) have a higher probability of being caught by
the government for non-compliance; 2) have more resources because they
do not pay franchisee fees or because of their size the fees are not onerous;
and 3) stay more loyal to the brand and fear hurting it by not complying
with the FLSA."8
Dr. Weil does identify the most obvious reason for his findings: small
franchisees, those with 110 outlets or less, lack knowledge and resources.19
But, he dismisses it because "mid-size" franchisees' non-compliance rates
are similar to single franchisees' rates. Dr. Weil's conclusion is contestable.
The fact that franchises with twelve stores have a higher non-compliance
116. See generally id.
117. Id.
118. See generally id.
119. See id. at 1002.
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rate than a single owner does not undermine the effect of resources devoted
to HR which affect compliance. In fact, it is the opposite. A twelve-store
franchisee cannot afford extensive HR, counsel, and training. Larger
employers (franchisors or franchisees) have resources, experience, and
knowledge to comply with the FLSA and other labor and employment
laws.
Dr. Weil and this Article have different assumptions. Dr. Weil
seemingly believes that all employers seek to violate the FLSA and cheat
their employees, unless they think they will be caught and have to pay
damages. This Article contends that most employers would strongly prefer
to comply, but it finds the law's nuances confusing and difficult.
Employers with resources hire HR professionals and lawyers to analyze
their practices, monitor their classifications, and ensure that rogue
managers do not violate the law. Small franchisees, Dr. Well proves, do
not have the resources to do this.' 20 According to Dr. Weil, the NLRB and
EEOC's solution is to incentivize franchisors to hold even less control over
their franchisees.' 21 This Article finds that that there are consequences to
this proposed solution.122 First, franchisors will do all they can to exercise
even less control so that millions of employees will work for employers
that do not know how, or cannot afford, to comply with Title VII, ADEA,
ADA, and the FLSA. Second, franchisors will be uncertain if they are joint
employers or not, and thus, they will no longer take risks by contracting
with rising entrepreneurs who cannot indemnify the franchisors. Third, and
finally, entrepreneurs who lacked the capital to expand their business will
no longer see franchising as a viable method.
Having employees working for fledgling employers, who lack guidance,
is a not a positive for society. Will this problem be solved if franchisors
only franchise with large franchisees, or, instead, do they stay out of the
franchise business? Such decisions will result in more costs than benefits.
C. The Socio-Economic Impact of BFI
The primary effect of the BFI decision, if it remains and it leads to its
likely conclusion, is that it will have a direct impact on the decision-making
of franchisors. Franchising businesses and the entrepreneurs who run these
businesses are among the most robust in the current U.S. economy. The
International Franchise Association ("IFA") forecasts growth, in the
number of franchise units, total employment, and total output, to be at their
120. See generally Ji & Weil, supra note 115.
121. See generally Weil, supra note 74.
122. See Press Release, Int'l Franchise Assoc., Franchise Business Index Hits Post-
Recession High (Aug. 14, 2013) (on file at http://www.franchise.org/franchise-
business-index-hits-post-recession-high).
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highest levels seen since the great recession. 123 The IFA Report also
suggests that, in 2015 alone, over 12,000 franchise establishments are
projected to open; but, as the IFA Report continues, it states that "there is
considerable downside risk to this forecast created by a recent ruling by the
NLRB. . . If this ruling survives legal challenges, it will impose additional
costs on franchisors associated with more oversight and insurance against
risk.",
124
In the closing monologue in Charles Dickens' a Christmas Carol,
Scrooge asked, "Are these the shadows of things that Will be or are they
the shadows of things that May be?";125 if these shadows "will be" the law,
then the 150 year old world of franchising will be severely altered. For the
sake of illustration, this Article offers a view of the potential change from
two perspectives: first, from the viewpoint of the large franchisor and
second, from the vantage point of the small entrepreneur owner-operator
and hopeful franchisor.
Large franchisors like McDonald's and Burger King have billions of
dollars invested in their brand, and they will have the ability to continue to
operate. The two entities also have thousands of franchisees currently
operating here in the United States. They will need to adapt and innovate
to maintain the value of their brand equity in the market. Through costly
indemnification and monitoring of current franchisees, they will seek to
mitigate the risk associated with now being a joint employer. Absent the
issue of unionization, they will still have myriad of other employment law
compliance costs that need to be managed or immunized against. The
question is not whether these practices will be costly to all franchisors.
They will be costly; the real question is of who will bear the cost.
If the contracts allow it, large franchisors will seek to redistribute the
costs associated with being a joint employer back where they belong: on
the operating unit. Franchisees, like those at McDonald's, will face a
quandary when this happens: bear the cost internally, or shift the additional
cost to the consumer. Quick Service restaurants have an elasticity of
demand estimate close to 1.126 This value reveals that, for every percent
increase in price, demand will decline by approximately the same percent,
causing the owner/franchisee's profit to decline. Estimates suggest current
123. Franchise Business Economic Outlook for 2015, supra note 8, at 13.
124. Id.
125. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (1843).
126. Abigail Okrent & Aylin Kumcu, Presentation of Paper: What's Cooking?
Demand for Convenience Foods in the United States at the Agricultural and Applied
Economics Association's 2014 Annual Meeting (July 28, 2014) http://ageconsearch.um
n.edu/bitstream/1 70541/2/OkrentKumcu%205-28-1 4%20AAEA.pdf.
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McDonald's earn on average six percent, 127 so it may or may not be able to
absorb the cost from operating profits. However, unless the owners want to
bear the full brunt of the lost profit, they will, on the margins, cut costs
where they can. They can cut costs through lowering marginal hours of
employment or reducing ancillary services purchased, and these cost-
cutting measures will have a dampening effect on the total wages paid,
local incomes, and taxes collected. These effects are unintended
consequences of the BFI ruling, and they are too important to dismiss.
Aside from how these large franchisors manage the cost shift with
current franchisees, large franchisors will also logically change their
behavior as it relates to growth in new franchises. Since smaller single-unit
franchisees would be less able to bear the higher costs of operations, now
imputed by the cost shifts, franchisors will increasingly be open to
applications for new units from only larger multi-unit franchisees. This
change will, on the margin, shut out the nascent entrepreneur franchisee
from the market. It may be only an unintended consequence of the NLRB,
but its decision in BFI will lead to fewer new franchises awarded to small
entrepreneurs, further concentrating the already increasing concentrated
world of multi-unit franchisees.
Perhaps the more meaningful impact will be felt in a different
component of the franchising space. Each year, hundreds of aspiring
owner/operators develop business plans and prepare to launch a franchise.
The launch process is not an easy task. According to the Franchise
Performance Group, it will cost between $100,000 and $150,000 to launch
a franchise system and between $500,000 and $2 million to take them from
launch through the initial ramp-up to fifty units, where estimates show
royalty revenues are covering costs. 128  These entrepreneurs will be
launching their business into a very competitive space and must then rely
on hitting that fifty-store threshold before their start-up capital runs out.
These people all hope to be their own version of Ray Kroc;
29
unfortunately, most will not succeed, and evidence shows that seventy-five
percent of newly formed franchises will cease to exist within twelve
years.1 30  This enormously high failure rate existed prior to the BFI
127. See generally William Johnson, What is the best advice for a young, first-time
startup CEO?, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-best-advice-for-a-young-
first-time-startup-CEO (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
128. Joe Mathews & Thomas Scott, Why Do Franchises Fail?, FRANCHISE
PERFORMANCE GRP. BLOG (May 16, 2014), http://www.franchiseperformance
group.com/franchising-failed-model/.
129. The Ray Kroc Story, McDONALD'S CORP., http://www.mcdonalds.com/us/en/
our story/our history/theraykrocstory.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
130. Scott Shane & Chester Spell, Factors for New Franchise Success, MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 44 (Apr. 15, 1998).
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decision. Through its action, the NLRB has now added additional costs
into an already risky business environment. Budding entrepreneurs will
now face the prospect of the joint-employment doctrine.
This Article is not talking about multi-billion dollar, multi-national
enterprises; to understand who will now bear this burden, one only needs to
peruse the Entrepreneur Magazine list of top new franchises for 2015.131
For example, Sweet Frog Premium Frozen Yogurt ("Sweet Frog") is
number 6 on the list,' 32 and after growing his business to ten units, Derek
Cha decided to go the franchising route in 2012. 31 In the first year, he sold
twenty-nine franchises. 34 Over three years (by 2014), there were 200
units, and most recently, there were 272 units. 35 Cha estimates that each
unit will need to employ thirteen employees.' 36 If, in 2012, the NLRB
ruling informed Cha he may be the joint employer of 377 employees
(29*13) within one year and the joint employer of 3,536 employees
(272*13) over a little more than three years, he may have been intimidated
out of the market. All of the people currently employed by the franchisees
of Sweet Frog would have never been offered a job. All of the
entrepreneurs who bought into a now very successful system would never
had the chance to open and earn their profits. All of the landlords renting
to Sweet Frog may still be sitting with empty storefronts. All of Sweet
Frog's local, state, and federal tax revenue would be non-existent.
This outcome may be one that the NLRB had anticipated, but it is a
likely external cost of its decision. Do the benefits, making McDonald's
easier to unionize, outweigh the costs discussed above? These costs, which
are borne by entrepreneurs; small business people; ancillary service
providers; local, state, and federal governments, do not only affect
McDonald's. It also affects other large franchisors. Instead, these large
franchisors would irrevocably change the landscape of the entrepreneur
entering the business of franchising.'1 37 The costs do outweigh the benefits.
131. See generally 2015 New Franchise Rankings, ENTREPRENEUR MAG. (2015),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/rankings/topnew- 115520/2015,- 1.html.
132. Id.
133. 2015 Franchise 500: Sweet Frog At A Glance, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE
(2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/sweetfrogpremiumfrozenyogurt/334
242-0.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. This is no anecdotal story. The list includes many other examples including but
not limited to Brickhouse Cardio Club, Engineering For Kids, and Human Healthy
Markets.
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CONCLUSION
Applying the BFI holding and the DOL and the EEOC advocated control
test to franchising is a disingenuous way of trying to make all franchisors
liable for a franchisee's legal violations, and it makes it easier for unions to
organize such employees. There is simply no basis to argue that franchisee
employees are better off when their franchisors exercise even less control.
The test is set up to make sure that franchisors cannot avoid joint-employer
status. If, however, franchisors find a way to toe that line, it seems clear
that franchisee employees and society will be worse off. Such a result is a
natural result of using 16th-20th century common law to solve a 21st
century problem. These governmental entities should therefore craft a 21st
century solution to the problem.
To develop such a standard, this Article proposes setting a goal and
trying to achieve it by examining the realities of the workplace. The goal,
at a minimum, is legal compliance. As Dr. Weil proves, small franchisees,
as well as franchisors, do not comply with the FLSA.'38  Thus,
governmental entities need to encourage franchisors to have more control,
not less. This is what the BF1 holding seeks to do; however, it could either
1) fail because franchisors will exercise less control to avoid liability; or 2)
severely compromise the franchise model. Accordingly, franchisors should
have an incentive or, better yet, a requirement to comply with law without
the strict liability.
All franchisors have a "brand standard" of legal compliance. It is not
necessary to develop a process for such compliance in a vacuum. Instead,
these entities can look to sexual harassment law with respect to vicarious
liability-specifically to the application of the Faragher/Ellerth standard
has been applied.
139
A similar standard should exist for franchisors/franchisees. Franchisors
must exercise reasonable care to ensure that franchisees are aware of
employment laws with which they must comply. There will be no such
thing as too much reasonable care, but policies and training of the
franchisee will suffice. All franchisee employees must be made aware that,
if they believe they have been the victim of legal violations, they should
138. See generally Weil, supra note 74
139. See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). Under Ellerth and Faragher,
employers can avoid liability for sexual harassment if they 1) exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct harassment; and 2) the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of what the employer provided or otherwise avoid harm. In practice, courts
have made it clear, employers will not be liable if they 1) have a strong anti-harassment
policy; and 2) legitimately investigate such claims, fix the problem (if there is one), and
discipline the harasser (if necessary).
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report it to the franchisor. The franchisors will have an obligation to
investigate. If they find violations, they need to make sure the franchisee
corrects the problem and pays damages. A franchisee who does not cure
the problem within sixty to ninety days, of being notified, will lose its
franchise. A franchisor who fails to investigate or force the franchisee to
cure the problem will be liable for damages.
This proposed standard is not perfect. First, it does not help unions who
wish to organize franchisors with top-down organizing; this "failure" is
acceptable. While the NLRA allows top-down organizing, it is bad policy
to alter an entire business structure with numerous opportunities and
economic positives simply on the assumption that this may help unions
organize. As stated, there are enough franchisor stores and large
franchisees for unions to engage in top-down organizing. Besides, the
NLRA was promulgated to encourage bottom-up organizing.
140
Franchisors, especially nascent franchisors, may balk at the requirement,
and franchisees may believe that the standard compromises their
independence. The old axiom, that a good deal occurs when no one is truly
happy, applies here in this case.
On the other hand, this Article's proposed standard solves many of the
problems that concern employee advocates, and, while it does put
additional obligations on franchisors, it protects the business model and
allows the franchisor to impart knowledge to ensure a better workplace. As
it stands, the BFI standard raises interesting questions. One's choice is
heavily influenced by the values of the majority of franchisors and
franchisees in this country. Franchisors and franchisees would like to
comply with the law and would prefer that their employees are not abused.
Also, litigation is long, expensive, draining, and, all-in-all, an awful
process. Thus, imparting knowledge, to ensure compliance and creating
methods to fix problems without litigation, is a positive development for
the United States economy, employees, and society. Another theory is that
the vast majority of franchisors and franchisees are bad actors who want to
take advantage of employees by violating the law. Under this theory,
litigation, and the overarching threat of litigation, is necessary to curtail the
desires of these bad actors. If you believe the former, the proposed
standard in this Article is a vast improvement. If you believe the latter,
there is a much bigger problems than the joint-employer doctrine.
140. Another potential problem is that unions could invoke an organizing tactic-
mass applications-to harass franchisors. Labor organizations could encourage
employees to file mass frivolous claims. The law could allow for a cause of action
against those who file mass frivolous claims.
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